Fiction skepticism
This post is inspired by Dinosaur Comics, but I can’t find the relevant comic—it was from a while ago. If anyone knows, tell me.
There are lots of fictional characters. Most fictional characters think that they are real. And they seem (to themselves) have all the reasons to believe they are real that I do. But in fact, they are fictional. They are mistaken. Moreover, there are so many fictional characters—let’s say there are vastly more of them than there are real people (though I doubt this is true). So it is antecedently much more likely that I am fictional than that I am a real flesh-and-blood person. My evidence gives me no way to discriminate between the two situations, since there are (deceived) fictional people with the same kind of evidence. So I have some reason to believe that in fact I am fictional, or at least to doubt whether I am real.
If this is a real skeptical problem, then it seems like it should be worse than some other such problems. To be concerned about the possibility of being a brain in a vat is one thing—but suppose that I knew there were actually lots of deceived brains in vats around in my world. That seems much more justification-threatening than merely possible such brains—though I admit I’m not sure why. And there really are lots of fictional characters, even though there aren’t lots of brains in vats.
But in fact, fiction skepticism sounds sillier to me than the usual skeptical scenarios. But, again, I’m not sure why.
Posted by Jeff on Tuesday, October 14, 2008
4 Comments:
You should read some Jasper Fforde - his books touch on this even if they are, for the most part, light reading
Oh, I have. Good stuff. And really, a lot of fictional characters raise these kinds of issues—"This isn't something from one of your books" (I wish I could remember what that line is from. Anyone?). Yet more threatening evidence!
To adjudicate these issues, we'd need to resolve some questions about the nature of fictional truth and the ontology of fictional characters. Many of your premises may well be literally false (or be elliptical for something that makes the skeptical argument equivocal.)
For example, you write:
There are lots of fictional characters.
This is denied by the same people who deny that there are unicorns.
Most fictional characters think that they are real. And they seem (to themselves) have all the reasons to believe they are real that I do.
Most people think that this is only true if it has an elliptical "it is true in the fiction..." operator stuck at the front of it, in which case this:
But in fact, they are fictional. They are mistaken.
is false.
Moreover, there are so many fictional characters—let’s say there are vastly more of them than there are real people (though I doubt this is true). So it is antecedently much more likely that I am fictional than that I am a real flesh-and-blood person.
Antecedent to what?
There are vastly more atoms than there are real people; is it antecedently much more likely to be an atom than a real flesh-and-blood person?
Of course you're right, Jonathan; I was being a bit silly in this post. I think you're right that to get this worry off the ground, you have to believe that there really are fictional characters, and that they really do seem to have experiences like mine—a concession I'd be reluctant to make.
I'm not sure I get your last objection, though. If we decide that there really are lots of fictional characters who think they are real, that's rather different from there being lots of atoms—since the atoms don't have any experiences like mine. In other words: suppose I ask what sort of being I am, and I don't consider any evidence except what things I take there to be; then yes, I would think it quite likely that I am an atom, or an arbitrary scattered fusion of atoms (even more of them!)—but as soon as I consider that I also, e.g., seem to see things, that pretty well rules that hypothesis out. But that *doesn't* rule out the hypothesis that I'm a fictional character, if we allow that there are such things and that they seem to see things.
But, as you say, probably we shouldn't allow that.
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